I find it somewhat incredible that Theodore Gatchel can call himself a “historian” considering the lack of key historical elements in his argument for accepting Bush’s failed Iraq policy (“Perils of substituting words for action,” Commentary, May 4).

His simplistic comments about President George H.W. Bush’s failure to remove Saddam following the first Gulf War disregard the historical precedent of U.S. policy in the region. The United States had used Iraq as a counterbalance to an Iranian threat to the region since the Reagan administration began supplying Iraq with arms in the early ’80s.

Furthermore, it is well-documented in the writings of Bush I, James Baker, Colin Powell and the former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney that these leaders were concerned that the prospect of tribal and sectarian violence outweighed the possible gains of such a regime change.

Gatchel cites the “Liberation Act of 1998” and the ensuing bombing campaign known as “Operation Desert Fox.” I feel he should have mentioned the aim of this operation as delineated by Gen. Anthony Zinni in his October 2002 testimony before Congress. The targets in the campaign were suspected weapons development sites — WMDs, in case you need to be reminded. General Zinni’s testimony that they were destroyed fell on deaf ears in the Bush II administration, Congress and the press in their zeal to sell an immoral war to the American public.

Gatchel states: “9/11 provided the rationale” for a policy of regime change. On the contrary, 9/11 provided the excuse, and was used as nothing more than a sales and marketing tool. Bush stomped on the bodies of the 9/11 victims to sell his reckless use of our military — to secure oil supplies and create permanent military bases from which to protect these interests. Nothing more, nothing less. He may have hoped for a compliant new regime, but ignoring a thousand years of Shia and Sunni animosity doomed this fiasco from the start.

Regime change through the intelligent use of our military, such as no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq, were effective in neutralizing any serious examination of the perceived “imminent threat” from Iraq. These “actions” coupled with financial support for secular leaders to overthrow the regime from within — over time — would have proven to be less costly both in terms of lives and treasure.

A vigorous pursuit of al-Qaida in Afghanistan would have done more to secure our interests in the region and throughout the world. But to quote Don Rumsfeld: “There were no good targets in Afghanistan” (i.e., no oil).

DAVID HASSLINGER

Pawtucket