NEW YORK

AS I WATCHED the live television coverage of the sentencing proceedings of the Station nightclub court case, I felt frustrated. Frustrated for the families who were seeking answers. Frustrated for the professional fire-safety experts who wanted to completely understand the fire to improve our national building and fire codes.

As a former member of the Federal Advisory Committee to the National Construction Safety Team (NCST), I have followed the Station fire from the very beginning. The NCST, created in the wake of the World Trade Center disaster, is a federal entity within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The NCST is charged with investigating building failures, much like the National Transportation Safety Board investigates aircraft crashes. The NCST was deployed to West Warwick to conduct a investigation into the fire.

From the beginning, the NCST was prevented from conducting a complete investigation. Legal barricades blocked access to physical evidence and witnesses. A representative of the Rhode Island Department of the Attorney General was quoted in The Journal on Aug. 28, 2003 ("Blocked access to evidence slows federal probe," news) as saying: "We recognize the value of what NIST is doing, but what they are doing is a civil, regulatory investigation. The criminal prosecution has to come first and we won't allow anybody to derail us from that goal."

As I watched the sentencing proceedings, I found it ironic that the Rhode Island attorney general's office argued about the importance of fire codes and enforcement. These are the very things that the NCST is charged with investigating, as well as recommending improvements to our national building and fire codes.

The NCST published its final investigation report in June 2005. While it contains technical details and recommendations for change, it was not as thorough or complete as it should have been. That is because, immediately after the fire, the Rhode Island attorney general's office would not allow NCST access to witnesses or evidence.

For example, the investigation report relies heavily on witness interviews conducted by The Journal and The Boston Globe, not interviews conducted by NCST team members. Surviving witnesses could have provided a wealth of information: their location at the initiation of the fire, escape paths chosen and rejected, and hindrances in their egress path. They may have also given NCST investigators insight into the smoke and fire conditions as they made their way out.

Incredibly, the actual polyurethane foam at the center of the investigation was never subjected to flammability tests by the NCST. The NSCT was forced to buy and test a sample of foam -- not necessarily the same foam actually used in the club -- to learn of its combustion characteristics.

Many unasked questions remain unanswered. For example, what role, if any, did the inward swinging door next to the performance platform play in slowing or preventing egress? Did club personnel prohibit patrons from exiting at this point, as reported in several news accounts, despite the fact that there was an exit sign at that location? Did the actual foam used in the club contain any flame-retardant chemicals? What was the actual "code history" of the facility, including inspection report details?

Given NIST's funding woes, it is unlikely that it will reopen its NCST investigation now that the Rhode Island attorney general's criminal investigation appears to have been concluded. The 2005 NCST report will stand as is, despite its lack of thoroughness.

Even with these shortcomings, the NCST report does contain recommendations for changes to our national "model" building and fire codes (regulations that are prepared by private sector organizations for adoption by public jurisdictions) and safety practices. Some of them have been incorporated into our model codes, including a critical requirement for automatic fire sprinklers in all new nightclubs under codes prepared by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). By comparison, the International Code Council (another fire- and building-code-writing body whose documents are adopted in many states) now requires sprinklers in new nightclubs with 100 or more people. Another NCST recommendation for changes to a NFPA standard that regulates indoor displays of pyrotechnics has not been implemented, despite the obvious hazards of using fireworks near combustible interior finishes.

At best, the record of positive improvements to our national codes and practices as a result of the Station fire is inconsistent and spotty.

Perhaps civil litigation will uncover additional facts. The families of the those who lost their lives, the injured, and the American public deserve to have the entire truth.

Glenn Corbett is an assistant professor of fire science at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.