WASHINGTON

IN OPPOSING January 2007’s Iraq troop surge plan, Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama cited the need for a political solution rather than intensified military action. Now, 18 months later, even after the surge’s successes have vindicated its supporters, Senator Obama continues to play up political measures and play down military action as the proper focus for U.S. policy in Iraq.

Senator Obama also asserts that U.S. involvement in Iraq has diverted resources away from Afghanistan. His solution is to withdraw forces from Iraq and send two combat brigades — approximately 7,000 troops, a mere fraction of the troops withdrawn — to Afghanistan. Given Senator Obama’s intention to stabilize Afghanistan with a larger troop presence, one would expect him to employ a more robust force.

Nonetheless, having de-emphasized the military’s role in creating progress in Iraq — and having been embarrassed by the surge policy’s impressive successes — Senator Obama now over-emphasizes the potential of a “surge” in Afghanistan to address the central problems there.

Reconstruction and stabilization operations in Afghanistan are not primarily undermined by a lack of U.S. forces. The main problem results from the safe haven that Taliban and pro-Taliban forces enjoy in Pakistan’s frontier regions and tribal areas. No troop increase will be sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan if the problems in Pakistan are not mitigated.

In August 2007, Senator Obama suggested expanding unilateral military strikes within Pakistani territory to target such militants. But such a strategy risks destabilizing a shaky but important ally: the Pakistani government. Senator Obama may have adopted this hawkish posture to deflect the allegations of national security weakness that his Iraq war position has stimulated. He has an interest in appearing tough on Afghanistan and Pakistan. But whatever the domestic political considerations, Obama’s Afghanistan policy fails to take account of important strategic considerations.

Most notably, a large majority within Pakistan opposes significant military action in the tribal areas. The enhanced military operations that Obama suggested in August 2007 would thus increase sympathy for terrorists and militants, divide the loyalties of Pakistan’s military and intelligence communities, and, most ominously, could destabilize Pakistan’s democratic government. These possibilities demand a different strategy. The United States should construct a strategy that reflects the desire within Pakistan for a political solution to terrorism.

Such a strategy depends upon the successful calibration of diplomacy, economic development, infrastructural improvement, education and military force. In recent months, Pakistan has offered too many carrots and too few sticks to militants in the tribal areas. As a result, extremists such as Tehreek-e-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani are free to expand their forces, kill pro-government tribal leaders, and fight against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Thus many U.S. commentators criticize Pakistan harshly, attributing to the strategy the sins of its implementation. But Pakistan’s multifaceted strategy is correct; what needs to be changed is the public perception that leads the Pakistani government to afford insufficient emphasis to its strategy’s military component.

The expansion of extremist influence within Pakistan is a grave threat both to Pakistan’s government and the United States. The government and much of the population is in denial about the seriousness of this threat. The United States can wake the Pakistani government from its daze through a strategic communications campaign of tough (and potentially threatening) persuasion coupled with a generous, targeted package of economic, civilian and administrative assistance for the Northwest Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan.

The Council on Foreign Relations’s Daniel Markey has produced an excellent blueprint for such a policy. In a July 2008 report titled “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt,” Markey emphasizes the importance of establishing a long-term U.S. commitment to Pakistan through comprehensive engagement. Markey, who worked on South Asia policy planning at the State Department from 2003 to 2007, has produced a report notable both for its rigorous analysis and its nonpartisan approach. Both Senator Obama and Sen. John McCain would do well to consider its recommendations.

Justin Polin is a foreign-policy analyst.