IN THEIR FEB. 11 Commentary piece “Facing the realities of the Andean region,” Lincoln Chafee and James N. Green claim that the “popularity” of Hugo Chávez and other leftist authoritarian-populist presidents in South America stems from the “alternative” economic and social policies they are offering to their citizens who, they claim, have been frustrated by the “failure of Washington Consensus reforms.”

The former senator and the Brown University professor point to reported increases in literacy rates and public-health indicators in Venezuela’s poorest neighborhoods. The writers fail to explain that, to the extent they were achieved (and many observers maintain that there has been little, if any, real improvement in the lives of the poor under Chávez), the more positive indicators merely reflect the temporary impact of handouts from the oil-rich Chávez regime that are not sustainable.

The underlying structural economic and political problems of Venezuela have not been solved, but Chávez has been able to mask them with the flood of petro-dollars into the country over which he has had sole authority. In the years since Hugo Chávez became president in 1999 and steadily consolidated de facto dictatorial power, in fact, living conditions there have actually deteriorated significantly.

Income inequality and poverty have not improved. According to the U.N. Development Program’s Human Development Index, Chávez has not reduced extreme poverty and income inequality. In fact, Venezuela’s score showed virtually no improvement between 1995 and 2003.

Crime in Venezuela continues to rise. A recent U.S. State Department notice warned that “U.S. citizens contemplating travel to Venezuela should carefully consider the risks to their safety and security. Violent crime, including express kidnappings, has increased in Venezuela, particularly in major cities and along the border with Colombia. In Caracas, violent crime has become an everyday occurrence.”

According to a 2005 U.N. report, more people die from gunfire in Venezuela than in any other country on Earth (including Iraq). The rise in lawlessness can be traced in part to an increasingly corrupt police force, as well as to the example of lawlessness set by the government’s expropriation of private property and the polarized atmosphere of class warfare that Chávez has encouraged. The homicide rate has doubled since Chávez took office in 1999, and Caracas suffers from the highest murder rate of any city in the Western Hemisphere.

Poor economic fundamentals plague the country. Venezuelans suffer from rising inflation — the highest rate in the region at more than 20 percent in 2007. Inflation is the cruelest tax and hurts the poor the most since they lose purchasing power for everyday goods and services.

In Venezuela, poor governance is pervasive. Chávez has ignored many needed repairs to infrastructure despite increased borrowing and growing budget deficits. For example, the only bridge connecting Caracas with its airport was closed for 18 months until a new bridge was finally opened in June 2007. The number of major electricity blackouts has increased and major highways and bridges are in need of substantial repairs.

Although high oil prices have kept the economy growing, there has been virtually no job-creating private investment. Chávez has conducted a relentless attack on Venezuela’s private productive sector, which has had the effect of creating shortages of basic foodstuffs. Meanwhile, Chávez has padded the government payroll with his friends and cronies. In 1999, there were 13 ministries in the Venezuelan government; now the bloated bureaucracy has 30.

The Chávez treasury has taken in more than $600 billion from oil revenues and new debt issuance, but the government’s transparency in handling those funds has diminished. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Venezuela dropped from 130th place out of 158 countries in 2005 to 162nd out of 179 countries in 2007, second only to Haiti as the most corrupt country in the Western Hemisphere.

Under Chávez, corruption permeates all levels of society. Bureaucrats rarely follow existing bidding regulations, while demanding bribes from ordinary citizens and neglecting basic government services. Government officials and others connected to the regime drive new cars and wear designer labels. Analysts say these nouveaux riches are concentrated in the oil, finance, construction, and government-service sectors. They are buying luxury goods and jetting off to their Miami condos, just as the corrupt class that they ousted had done. Pundits call them the “Boliburguesia,” short for Bolivarian bourgeoisie.

The real problem is that the Washington Consensus reforms were never fully implemented. PdVSA (the giant state-owned oil company) has become a state piggybank more than a company; under Chávez it has been spending nearly twice as much on social programs as it spends on its oil and gas operations. Meanwhile, PdVSA, the source of all this wealth Chávez is squandering, is being destroyed as an efficient oil company.

Chávez has promoted and exploited the myth believed by Venezuela’s poor — that they are poor while the country is rich — and blames the U.S. for imposing the painful Washington Consensus market reforms of the 1990s that seemed to reward only the elites and foreign investors through large scale privatization. The fact is that the money from oil could buy the means with which to create a Venezuela in which true wealth from a market-based economy could be produced. Instead, Chávez is using the oil money to increase his own political power and enrich his cronies.

According to former Venezuelan Minister of Economy Moises Naim, the Washington Consensus market reforms would have worked in Venezuela if they had been fully implemented, but they never were. Edmond Saade, president of the Venezuelan American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, observes that the poor are getting free food and free medical attention and this makes them feel better, even if they are not being empowered to become producers and to break away from the paternalistic “revolution.” The government’s spending spree has not been accompanied by long-term investment.

Chávez is actually just another authoritarian caudillo populist, in the mold of Argentine dictator Juan Peron and Cuba’s totalitarian dictator (and Chávez mentor) Fidel Castro. And Chávez makes friends with “authoritarian capitalists” from Iran, China and Russia, who seek to use him in their struggle against the United States and Western capitalism.

Instead of turning back the clock to the failed socialist/totalitarian models of the Soviet era, truly “progressive” governments in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Chile and Brazil are implementing true, deep reforms to make their countries competitive in the globalized economies. Unlike the self-serving and power-hungry “Chávista” populists, the political leadership in those countries, where the wave of positive change in Latin America can be seen, is concerned not just with its own power and wealth but rather with meeting the demands of citizens who yearn to live happier, more prosperous lives.

J. William Middendorf II, of Little Compton, is a former secretary of the Navy and former ambassador to The Netherlands and the European Union.