SHOULD THE U.S. MILITARY kick in the door in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, forcing that stricken nation to accept humanitarian relief? Maybe — but not without paying due heed to the costs and unintended consequences of military action.

Some commentators — notably Robert Kaplan of the Center for a New American Security, writing in The New York Times — are toying with the idea of providing aid at gunpoint. And on its face, the case for forcible humanitarian intervention does appear compelling. As many as 60,000 are dead following Cyclone Nargis, another million are in immediate danger, and Burma’s military junta is admitting only token relief shipments.

Washington and other prospective donors have two choices. They can stand aside while additional thousands perish for lack of supplies. Or they can threaten or use force in this “non-permissive environment,” to use the clunky Pentagon jargon. Positioning credible U.S. military power in the Bay of Bengal might be enough to induce a change of behavior on the junta’s part.

And if gunboat diplomacy failed, these assets would let the Bush administration follow through on its threats.

The means are available for such an enterprise. As it happens, the United States has forces in neighboring Thailand for the annual Cobra Gold multinational exercise. With U.S. Navy and Marine units in ready striking distance of the theater, forceful diplomacy is a viable option for Washington. But even so, the administration shouldn’t act without careful forethought about the consequences of military action in the Indian Ocean region.

Philosopher Carl von Clausewitz bequeathed us a simple formula for reckoning the costs and benefits of military campaigns. For Clausewitz, war was a rational political act, so the value assigned the political objective “must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.” Governments should forgo campaigns in which the effort required will outstrip the value of the object.

Apply this to Burma. How much would an operation cost in lives and treasure? U.S. planners must factor in possible armed resistance from Burmese forces. And, while the Burmese military should be a fairly easy nut to crack, what if combat with U.S. forces shattered the regime, leaving the afflicted country without a government? This would leave the United States with another nation-building operation — beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

As Gen. Colin Powell quipped before the invasion of Iraq: You break it, you bought it.

This could mean a protracted engagement in the Indian Ocean. Not only Iraq and Afghanistan but also the crises of the 1990s — Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo — show that constructing humane, sovereign states from failed ones is a painstaking, time-consuming endeavor. And success is far from certain. To rush into Burma — even for the best of motives — would tempt fate.

And then there are the unintended diplomatic consequences. India sees itself as the leading power in the Indian Ocean basin, and indeed it has declared its own counterpart to the Monroe Doctrine. New Delhi thus might take a dim view of prolonged U.S. ground operations in nearby Burma, even if it agrees in principle on the need for humanitarian intervention. This hands-off attitude is something the Bush administration should expect to encounter.

Washington might see its nascent partnership with New Delhi suffer — especially if the operation went badly.

On the other hand, India’s claims to regional leadership might represent America’s opportunity. U.S. diplomats might reasonably say: If you want to be number one in your geographic neighborhood, fine. You need to assume responsibility for disaster response and other international police work. That’s true of not just apolitical contingencies like the 2004 tsunami off Aceh, but also politically freighted ones like Burma.

There are few easy cases.

If New Delhi took the lead, Washington could accept a supporting part, sharing not only the operational but the political burden. There’s ample historical precedent for this, from President McKinley’s dispatching a contingent for the German-led intervention in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to President Clinton’s deferring to Australian leadership during the 1999 intervention in East Timor. Just because the United States can do everything doesn’t mean it must.

Leadership carries responsibility — a fact the administration must impress upon rising Asian powers such as India.

James Holmes, an occasional contributor, is an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College and a senior research fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views expressed here are his alone.