01:46 PM EDT on Wednesday, July 12, 2006

BY GERALD M. CARBONE
Journal Staff Writer

Nathanael Greene wanted rum; some strong riding horses that "go easy"; maybe some plump turkeys; and a half-cask of some port or claret wine.

Greene dreamed of food, drink and good horses as he marched south through the thick, boggy woods of North Carolina; he had none of those things. He wrote his wish list to Abner Nash, governor of North Carolina, 10 days after Nash promised to send him bacon, cattle, English cheese "and a wagonload of turkeys, chickens, fresh butter, turnips, etc."

I thank your Excellency for your good intentions respecting the Poultry, Greene wrote to Nash on April 13, 1781, but I had not the good fortune to receive any.

Indeed nothing in Greene's papers indicates that he and his men ever received any of the promised goods, except some rum, as they trudged from North Carolina's Troublesome Creek toward Camden, S.C. -- a march of 140 miles. This time Greene's infantry marched without the protection of Henry Lee's Legion of horsemen. Greene had sent the Legion down the Pee Dee River to hook up with militia Gen. Francis Marion.

Greene had sent his militia into South Carolina in three lightning-like prongs with Marion and Lee in the east, Thomas Sumter operating near Greene in the center and the taciturn Andrew Pickens patrolling the west. The militia generals had orders to capture whatever British outposts they could take.

Camden housed one of the larger British outposts, and Greene planned to attack that one himself.

It's hard nowadays to picture just how primitive was a backwoods, 18th-century town. A rough-hewn stockade fence with five cannon ensconced in "redoubts" or earthworks, formed a protective square around much of the town of Camden. Within its wooden walls were a store, a jail, a split-log stable and one nice house belonging to merchant Joseph Kershaw, who had been chased out of town by the British.

Nine hundred British troops lived within the confines of this stockade town near the banks of the Wateree River, a key water route for supplying the backcountry.

Greene churned on for Camden through country he called extremely difficult to operate in, being much cut to pieces by Deep Creeks, and impassible Morasses; and many parts are covered with such heavy timber and thick under brush as exposes an Army to surprise attack.

It took 12 days of steady marching for Greene's troops to pull up before the walls of Camden. He reported:

At our arrival at Camden we took a post at Log Town, about half a mile in front of their Works, which upon reconnoitering were found to be much stronger than had been represented, and the garrison much larger.

Greene determined that the stockade town was too strong to attack, but he had a plan: he withdrew his army to Hobkirk's Hill, a high sandy ridge less than 2 miles north of Camden. Here he would wait, hoping to induce the Enemy to sally from the Fort to attack him.

Here, so close to the enemy, Greene ordered roll call taken at least three times a day and warned every part of the army must be ready to stand to Arms at a Moments warning.

He camped in battlefield formation that night, with every man sleeping where he would be stationed in the event of a battle on that ground. It was a good thing he did.

Battle of Hobkirk's Hill

The 900 men behind the stockade fence of Camden fell under the command of Lord Francis Rawdon, who'd been saddled -- the Encyclopedia of the American Revolution tells us -- with "a curious reputation as the ugliest man in England." He was the man who while in New York made the infamous observation that American women wouldn't submit to rape "with the proper resignation."

He was 26, tall, strong and like Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis, aristocratic. He was an ensign and an Oxford student at 16, and stormed to the top of Breed's Hill at Boston at 18. Rawdon was also like Cornwallis in his aggressiveness; when he saw Greene encamped outside his gates with 1,500 men, he took the bait: Rawdon decided to attack.

Rawdon marched with no music, opting instead to arm his fifers and drummers with musket and bayonet.

On the morning of April 25, 1781, Greene buoyed his men's spirits by writing in his orders that every man would receive two days' worth of food and a gill of spirits . . . as soon as the spirits arrive.

Around 10 a.m., before the rum wagon came up, Greene heard the thunder of musketry at the base of Hobkirk's Hill not 300 yards away, the sound of Rawdon's troops meeting Greene's sentinels.

The British pushed up Hobkirk's Hill in a line, and Greene formed a wider line of his men to meet and flank them.

At Guilford Courthouse, where he'd hoped to repulse a British attack, Greene had kept his cavalry in the rear for use as a reserve force that could dash wherever needed. But at Camden, Greene had one goal: to capture all of Rawdon's men by cutting off their retreat to Camden. Instead of keeping his cavalry in reserve, Greene ordered Col. William Washington to circle Rawdon's army and attack from the rear.

When Rawdon saw Greene's line spreading wide across Hobkirk's Hill to flank his, he brought up his reserve infantry to form an even wider line to outflank Greene.

For months, Greene had been complaining about the lack of officers in his Army, a shortage that was now about to hurt him. Officers were as critical to 18th-century armies as quarterbacks are to football teams. They read the situation, barked the orders that men were to move to, made necessary changes; officers were like quarterbacks but the stakes they played for were life or death.

As the British advanced steadily up Hobkirk's Hill, Greene ordered his men not to fire, but to fight with the bayonet.

The British stopped and fired. A shot cut down Capt. William Beatty of the Maryland line, described by Greene as a most excellent Officer and an ornament to his profession.

With Beatty down, much of the Maryland line was far from their next officer, Col. John Gunby.

A local resident who favored the American cause, Samuel Mathis, interviewed those who fought that day and concluded:

"[T]he battle was equal or rather in our favor and only ONE word, a SINGLE WORD, and that only because it was spoken out of season, turned the fate of the day."

The word was "halt," and it was spoken by Colonel Gunby, in overall command of the Maryland regiments. He was speaking to the center of his line, which had begun to charge before the men near the ends of the line heard the order, causing his men to form the shape of a bow. When he shouted halt, Gunby meant for the men in the center to wait, but those who heard the command became confused by it: first Greene told them not to shoot, which generally meant that they'd be on the offensive pressing a bayonet attack. Then Gunby told them to halt before a charging British force. The orders made no sense and the confused men broke ranks and ran.

Greene rode along the ridge trying to restore order; Col. William Davie recalled, "General Greene exposed himself greatly in this action . . . ; so much so, that one of the officers observed to me, that his conduct during the action resembled more that of a captain of grenadiers, than that of a major-general."

Washington's cavalry had become bogged down behind the British lines, where he was capturing stragglers and trying to process prisoners. Without horses Greene could not stop the Maryland men's panicked flight. He ordered the rest of his men to retreat.

Greene stopped to camp that night in the same sandy, shadowy Pine Barrens where eight month before Horatio Gates had lost an army.

Camden seems to have some evil genius about it, Greene wrote. What ever is attempted near that place is unfortunate.

Before the retreat the battle had been bloody; Greene's artillery blew the British off the Great Road with much carnage. Both sides lost about 250 men.

Losing the Battle of Hobkirk's Hill really galled Greene. Had we defeated the enemy not a man of the party could have got back into town , he groused. Rawdon's sally was what every body wished for, but the event was unfortunate. The loss on either side is not greatly different one from the other. I think the enimy's must have been the greatest. The disgrace is more vexatious than anything else. . . .

As he licked his wounds in the Pine Barrens, Greene made plans to attack Rawdon again. His password and countersign on the day after the battle were "Persevere" and "Fortitude."

Catching up on some correspondence, he responded to the French Minister to the United States, Chevalier de La Luzerne, whose letter to Greene had taken three months coming from Philadelphia. For the Chevalier, Greene summed up the Southern Campaign thus far:

We fight get beat rise and fight again. The whole Country is one continued scene of blood and slaughter.

And to the Marquis de Lafayette, on May 1, 1781, Greene wrote:

We fight[,] get beat, rise and fight again. We have a bloody field; but little glory.

gcarbone@projo.com / (401) 277-7434

A continuing series.