11:39 AM EDT on Sunday, June 19, 2005

BY JOEL RAWSON
Executive Editor

SAMARRA, Iraq -- The United States is in the fourth month of the third year of the War in Iraq.

The job the Army has been given has gone from a clear-cut invasion and the toppling of a totalitarian regime during the spring of 2003 to an ambiguous mission that is neither war nor peacekeeping, with no identifiable end nor defined measure of success by the summer of 2005.

The public is losing patience. According to a Gallup Poll conducted June 6-8 among 1,003 adults, 59 percent of Americans say it is time to start getting out.

During the 18 days we spent with the 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment of the Rhode Island National Guard last month, one event seemed best to show the difficulty the soldiers face and the frustration they experience.

It is the story of a raid that was carefully planned, briefed in detail, rehearsed, coordinated with tank, artillery and helicopter support, and then called off.

TO UNDERSTAND the significance the soldiers placed on the raid, it is first necessary to experience the nature of today's war.

It is the insurgent bombers' war. In the language of the military, the enemy is divided into Anti Iraqi Forces (the AIF) and Foreign Fighters (the FF).

The Anti-Iraqi Forces are the people believed to be planting bombs beside the roads and blowing up the soldiers on convoy guard or on patrol. (Whether an Iraqi considers himself to be pro-Iraqi or anti-Iraqi or religious Iraqi or just plain angry Iraqi can be known only to him.)

The men of the 173rd had spent several months hunting the bombers of the AIF along Main Supply Route Tampa and several of its secondary roads. They had established hidden surveillance posts and manned them in daylight and in darkness for as many as four days in a row. They were armed with sniper rifles equipped with high-tech sights and were prepared to kill the bombers when they saw them.

During those months they watched one road in particular. They were blown up on that road at least four times, suffering no serious injuries, but at the same time they did not see, let alone kill, a single bomber.

The bomber controls his war. He decides where to strike, when to strike and whom to strike.

He has the initiative, while the soldiers patrol the roads, hunkered down inside armored Humvees staring hard at the pavement and the dirt and gravel shoulders for any sign of a bomb.

Journal photo / John Freidah

The men of a R.I. National Guard unit in Iraq get the word: The raid is off. ``I know how frustrated you are,'' their commander tells them. ``I know how hard you worked and I'm truly sorry.''

The soldiers have lost the initiative in this war, and they see themselves as targets rather than aggressors.

On a foot patrol in a rural area along the Tigris River, the unit commander, Capt. Michael Manning of North Kingstown, was asked if he was afraid of mines.

No, Manning said, he wasn't. His soldiers were probably the first Americans to ever visit that area and it didn't make much sense for the enemy to plant mines in a place seldom patrolled by Americans.

It made much more sense for the enemy to mine the highways the Americans use all day, every day. Even bombers try to make efficient use of their resources.

The Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF) appear to be the rational side of the enemy equation. Although they are made up of many clans and cells fighting for different reasons, most fight to run away and live to fight another day. They are extremely difficult to find so they can be killed or captured.

However, they can be discouraged. Manning points to the fact that when his men operate along a highway, the bombings pretty much stop. He attributes the success to the presence of his soldiers.

The AIF bombers' war will not bring them a military victory, but it might force the faction in power to cut them in on the action. It is also a low-level war they can sustain indefinitely. Think of the Irish Republican Army and its 90-year war of terror against Britain.

The Foreign Fighters (FF) are another story. They come from the same stock that flew the jets into the World Trade Center -- jihadists from Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya and several other places, whose primary goal is to kill and who are willing to die doing it.

They are the people who drive the car and truck bombs to attack convoys and troop assemblies. The only way to stop them is to kill them. They appear to have no political goals that can be satisfied. Theirs is a social and religious war, a battle between cultures, fought by young men, and some women, who want to die for a cause larger than their lives.

They too will be able to sustain their war for a long time, as Hamas has done in its 18-year war against Israel.

ABOUT 12:30 in the afternoon of Tuesday, May 10, Manning first alerts his team leaders to a raid being planned to root out terrorists operating several miles from their Forward Operating Base Brassfield-Mora, north of Samarra.

At 10 a.m. on Wednesday, May 11, Manning briefs his team leaders on the warning order for the raid. "Here's the deal," he says. "The mission is a go."

The raid will be in an area the soldiers have patrolled before, and they know at least 20 women and children are there. Helicopter crews reported seeing three men pulling bags out of a hole, and the 173rd has observed on several nights what could be sentries guarding a road.

It is to be a big raid, supported by tanks, armored cavalry, artillery and attack helicopters.

The 173rd will be the assault troops.

Manning tells his sergeants there will be sufficient force to support them. "In the U.S. Army we fight 3 to 1," he said. "We got our 3-to-1 odds out there."

He also tells them that the intelligence he was given indicates Foreign Fighters are in the area. If they are there, he says, "we got a fight."

The assault will involve 50 members of the 173rd landing from five helicopters in two waves -- three helicopters in the first wave and two in the second.

Manning says the most likely scenario is an unopposed landing and minimal resistance. He bases this on Staff Sgt. David Raymond's earlier visit, which had been uneventful.

He says the worst scenario is the enemy opening fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades as the helicopters touch down in the landing zone. The jihadists, he says, are not afraid to engage aircraft. A few days earlier, they had stood up to armed helicopters in a fight south of Samarra in which an American was killed.

The 173rd will prepare for the worst scenario.

Staff Sgt. John Shimkus and Sgt. 1st Class Robert Saquet raise questions about how the tanks will be used. "If you move tanks down there," Saquet says, "you've given up the element of surprise."

"We need somebody there in a blocking position," Manning says. "We didn't get to vote on this."

AT 4 P.M. on May 11, after visiting the battalion officers the 173rd supports, Manning tells his men, "We have been delayed 24 hours, possibly 48."

He says nobody wants to be in a "rush to failure." The weather may be too bad for the helicopters and they wanted to "work the fire piece a little better." They will be operating outside the range of accurate artillery fire and they want to move a gun in closer to the raid.

The sergeants question the timing of the second wave of two helicopters scheduled to land on a second objective several minutes after the first wave has alerted any enemy. Why not, they ask, hit them simultaneously?

Manning stops them. "Guys," he says, "let me brief the plan."

They discuss the time of the raid. Is it better to land in total darkness or when there is just enough light to see? Staff Sgt. Thomas O'Hare says, "When is their time of prayer? If they're devout, their imam is going to have them up by 4:45."

The sergeants ask what formation the soldiers should take on the ground. "Squads in column," he says. "Fire team wedge."

"Full sprint?" Sgt. Robert Carrigg asks.

"We'll be hustling but not sprinting," Manning says. "Slow is smooth, smooth is fast."

Manning displays a slide that reads: Mission Purpose -- Eliminate or capture suspected AIF/FF.

"Do you think we can execute this?" Manning asks. He is challenging them.

Carrigg says, "I know I can [expletive] execute this."

"That's not what I asked," Manning says. "Do you think WE can execute this."

"Yes, sir," Carrigg says.

The sergeants are pumped. They are going on the offensive and they like it.

LATE THAT EVENING, the helicopter pilots fly in to talk about the raid. They object to the timing of the landings and the plan is modified.

As they leave, a soldier discusses the Army's priorities for the War in Iraq. Roughly paraphrased, he ticks them off this way:

1. Force Protection. The Army's first priority is to protect itself, to avoid casualties.

2. Train the Iraqi military and police. The Iraqis need to be able to bring order and stability to the country so that the Army can go home.

3. Keep the supply routes open. Almost everything the Army needs to live -- food, water, fuel and ammunition -- comes up the four-lane roads from Kuwait.

4. Troop morale. Get the troops out on rest and recreation.

5. Eliminate or capture suspected AIF and FF. On the Army's list of priorities, the last is aggressive warfare.

AT 4 P.M. on Thursday, May 12, the men go to a firing range in the desert where they go through weapons drills. Each man shoots the rifles and machine guns his team will carry on the raid, practicing running and then stopping, shooting from standing and kneeling positions.

They then set up a "glass house" using two-by-fours and plywood target panels to outline a room with a doorway. They practice charging into the room to capture or kill anybody who might be inside. It is a rehearsal for the houses they plan to hit on the raid.

Sgt. Wayne Lynch gathers his men for another run-through. "Everybody comfortable," he says. "If you're not, cut your ID card in half because we're going on a raid in a day."

ON THE MORNING of May 13, Friday, the men are getting ready. Staff Sgt. Timothy Halloran and Spc. Justin Kelley clean their weapons.

At 11, O'Hare and Shimkus brief their soldiers on how to treat civilians. O'Hare tells them the Iraqis have little use for the Foreign Fighters who, generically, are referred to as Syrians. The Iraqis, O'Hare says, put pictures of Syrians on the 7 p.m. news.

"Syrians came here to kill Iraqis," O'Hare says. "It's not that they're not pissed off at us. They're just more pissed off at the Syrians."

Whether this is a good operation or a bad operation, he tells them, will depend on how they treat prisoners.

Shimkus says, "Treat the women well." He has already told them not to separate the women from their children, and Saquet has told them to expect chaos -- kids screaming, women yelling. If the soldiers keep the women with their children, the women tend to mother their kids, making less trouble.

O'Hare tells them to put the prisoners' possessions, such as wallets and watches, in bags and place each bag in the prisoner's shirt, all the while showing it to him.

AT NOON, Manning calls all his soldiers together and says, "All right, guys, this is going to be one of the hardest things I've had to do. Brigade just put this operation on hold."

The reason, he believes, is the death of two brigade soldiers in the past week, one killed in a firefight, another killed by a roadside bomb.

"The operation has been halted, canceled, delayed," Manning says. "I know how frustrated you are. I know how hard you worked and I'm truly sorry."

He tells them that their selection as the assault troops for the raid is a validation of their worth. "We have to assume that's an AIF training area?" Sgt. Chet Crowell asks.

"Right," Manning says.

"If these people are worried about soldiers being blown up," Crowell says, "why don't we just go home?"

"It's a valid comment," Manning says. "You have every right to be frustrated. I feel frustrated, but this isn't our decision to make.

"You don't have to like it, but I need you to understand how these events come down. Let's stay focused. I'll get you into the field tomorrow morning.

"That's where we are, guys. That's where we are. That's all, guys."

THE NEXT MORNING, Saturday, four teams go out before dawn, going fast down some of the most heavily mined stretches of road in Iraq.

The night before, Manning had told the teams going out about the bombers: "They go where we go. LRS [Long Range Surveillance] are the only people down there. The 12 IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] were meant for LRS. They're trying to kill you guys.

"The AIF is beginning to fight at night. Never forget somebody is trying to kill you."

A surveillance team sets up for three days and a Humvee patrol goes through villages to the south for several days. The missions are uneventful and the frustration persists.

Sgt. Josh Heywood, a Johnston policeman says, "You know what sucks about the war? We are on the defensive. We need to be more offensive."

ACROSS IRAQ, there are offensive operations. At the same time the raid was being planned and canceled, a large Marine Corps and Army operation in the desert to the west on the Syrian border killed about 100 of the enemy, a large arms cache was discovered outside Baghdad, and 40,000 Iraqi police and soldiers began a sweep of the city.

Just days after the raid was called off in May, the same brigade commander sent the 173rd north to Baiji. The insurgents there had seized the initiative, coming right up to the gates of the forward operating base to detonate their bombs, shooting soldiers and firing an occasional mortar shell or rocket.

The brigade commander wanted aggressive action taken and he sent the 173rd to do it.

And by Friday of last week, the Marines had returned to the Syrian border in another sweep to stop insurgents and foreign fighters.

AT SUPPER on May 20, Sgt. Joseph Voccio of Cranston was talking about hunting with Spc. Randy Leboeuf of Cumberland.

Voccio is as good and dedicated a soldier as any in the Army. He thrives on adversity, loves the hunt, loves his country, and yet, out of nowhere, he said, "We're going to lose this war."

He may be wrong. The United States may not lose this war. It simply may not be winnable before domestic politics or changing world circumstances force the Army to go home. It will then be up to the Iraqis to decide what their country will be.

Or he may be right. . . .

Find more dispatches from Iraq by Journal Executive Editor Joel Rawson and photographer John Freidah, at:

http://projo.com/extra/2005/iraq/rawson/