Opponents say the document buttresses their arguments with analysis on the fiery outcomes of certain LNG spills, while proponents say such likelihoods are being exaggerated.

01:00 AM EDT on Tuesday, June 1, 2004

BY MARK REYNOLDS
Journal Staff Writer

A new U.S. government report on liquefied natural gas acknowledges it does not assess the hazards of shipping and unloading the fuel.

But the report does describe some hazardous fires. According to one scenario, a 3-foot 3-inch gash in the side of an LNG tanker ship could feed a fire for more than 30 minutes. A half-mile away, the heat would be intense enough to inflict second-degree skin burns in the first 40 seconds of exposure.

The scenario is based on computer models designed to assess the consequences of LNG spills at sea or in harbors.

The results -- and the calculations that underlie them -- are spelled out in the 75-page report, which has been under intense review by scientists, LNG developers and others since the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) released it May 14.

The commission intends to use the methods recommended in the report to assess the risks of LNG spills in Providence, Fall River, Somerset and other places where developers want to build large port facilities for receiving LNG supertankers.

For the most part, industry experts and scientists have offered cautious reactions to the highly technical report. FERC gave them only two weeks to comment on it. That comment period ended Friday.

But one thing seems clear: the latest report has not settled the contentious debate over the risks of bringing vast quantities of LNG into populated areas.

Project supporters still accuse their foes of exaggerating the likelihood of catastrophic terrorist attacks and other disasters, while understating New England's desperation for cheap, clean energy.

Opponents say the report buttresses their arguments by offering authoritative, government-backed analysis on the fiery outcomes of certain LNG spills.

Federal regulators in the middle of the dispute warn that the report does not provide the necessary site-specific information to make any sound conclusions using the basic formulas and models recommended by the report.

They stress that the report falls far short of any type of risk assessment because it gives no estimates on the probability of such an event.

"It's a tool that the commission can use to assess individual projects," said the chief of FERC's program office, J. Mark Robinson. "It doesn't stand for anything by itself."

LNG IS PRODUCED by superchilling natural gas into a liquid form, making it far easier to transport.

Once LNG is shipped, often halfway across the globe, a warming process returns the product to its gaseous form. Under heat, one gallon of LNG expands to 600 gallons of natural gas.

The precise behavior of liquefied gas during a major spill at sea, or in a sheltered harbor, is unknown. No such incident has ever occurred.

"We don't have a real-world spill to provide us with the real-world data to let us know what would happen," said FERC spokesman Bryan Lee.

So FERC commissioned an analysis from ABSG Consulting, of Irvine, Calif., paying the firm $97,656 to recommend the best tools for hypothesizing the potential outcome of LNG spills.

After months of research, consultants have recommended calculations and computer models for estimating how LNG would:

Pour through holes of certain sizes in the side of a tanker ship.

Spread through the water.

Change from its liquid form to a vapor on contact with the air and drift in the atmosphere under certain specific weather conditions.

Burn once it has ignited.

The report applies the recommended calculations and models in two scenarios.

One involves a hole of 3 feet, 3 inches. The other scenario involves an opening of 16 feet.

The report says LNG would spill through the 16-foot hole at a rate of 290,000 pounds per second over the course of 90 seconds.

It would spread across the water until the diameter of the so-called "pool" reaches a maximum distance of 880 feet, the report says.

If ignited, the pool would burn for nearly seven minutes.

With winds of 20 mph, the flames would flare 1,400 feet into the sky, at an angle of about 30 degrees.

At just a little more than a half-mile from the center of the so-called "pool fire," the heat would be hot enough to ignite wood and melt plastic.

Such heat would inflict second-degree burns within 11 seconds, the report says. Third-degree burns, which char the skin, would happen soon after.

A little less than a mile away, the heat would cause second-degree burns in 30 seconds and third-degree burns in 50 seconds.

Controlling such a fire would be difficult if not impossible.

"I don't want any part of that," said acting Providence Fire Chief Gary Mulcahy.

FERC OFFICIALS acknowledge that their scenario is based on several assumptions.

The report doesn't analyze the circumstances of how a double-hulled LNG tanker could sustain a 16-foot hole to one of its tanks.

Its projections on how LNG would flow through such a hole do not account for the actual structure of the typical tanker, which has a double hull and other barriers protecting its cargo.

The report also assumes that something would cause the LNG to catch fire.

Its analysis of the fire doesn't explore the vulnerability of the tanker ship, and the rest of its LNG cargo, to the pool fire.

"This report does not and was not intended to provide a measure of risk to the public," the report says. "A thorough risk assessment would consider both the probabilities and consequences of hazardous events."

However, the models and science compiled in the report will be at the center of future discussions about the risks of LNG.

Reaction has been somewhat muted during the past two weeks.

"In view of the fact that I don't yet have my comments finished, I'm very reluctant to make any statements about it," said one scientist, Jerry Havens. Havens designed some of the software that helped generate some of ABSG's conclusions.

James A. Fay, a Massachusetts Instituture of Technology professor, said the recommended methods improperly account for frictional forces that influence the spread of an LNG pool.

As a result, the pool's size is underestimated, Fay said, who described the flaw as a minor issue, a mere "decimal point."

"In the end," he said, "they end up with an amount of radiation that I think is fairly realistic."

"It's close to what I calculated and much closer to what I calculated than the Quest report," he added.

The U.S. Department of Energy commissioned Quest Consultants Inc. to analyze the risks of reopening the Distrigas terminal in Everett, Mass., after the terrorism of Sept. 11, 2001.

Since then, some LNG developers have also promoted the smaller-scale figures calculated by Quest.

Developers have been cautious about commenting on FERC's report.

"The study is technically very complex," said James Grasso, a spokesman for Weaver's Cove LNG, the developer of an LNG port facility proposed for a site in Fall River. "We're still reviewing it and trying to understand what it says."

The comments that Weaver's Cove submitted to FERC were not available Friday.

Keyspan, the firm that has proposed a large terminal at Fields Point in Providence, welcomed FERC's new report.

"We look forward to the peer review and public comments on this report," said spokeswoman Carmen Fields, who noted that the report "is not meant to address the probability of certain scenarios."