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Chief bars firefighters from study
The report cites initial confusion over the fire's location and a three-minute delay before trucks were dispatched. 01:00 AM EDT on Wednesday, July 14, 2004
Consultants say they will never know exactly what happened in the first critical minutes of The Station nightclub fire because the West Warwick fire chief prohibited his firefighters from participating in its study. But one aspect of those chaotic moments was confirmed yesterday by an author of the report: Initial confusion had some firefighters believing the fire was not at The Station nightclub at all -- but at the downtown fire station. "Some people internalized that it was at the fire station," said Grant C. Peterson, vice president for the consulting group, Titan Corp. "Whether someone actually responded to the fire station, I don't know." The matter remains unclear. Fire Chief Charles Hall would not allow members of his department to be interviewed for the report, explaining that questions could reopen psychological wounds, Peterson said. Peterson said Hall's refusal was initially frustrating: "We always try to get access to the first responders." But Hall had "great concern about the challenges his team has gone through. I think the exact words were: 'It would tear the scabs back off the healing process.' " Striking an understanding tone, Peterson said West Warwick's firefighters "faced some of the most difficult challenges any rescue team could possibly imagine in the world" as they tried to extricate burned victims and, later, bodies, from the fire. Peterson noted, however, he did not face the same obstacle when his company performed a similar audit of the federal government's response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. In that case, Peterson said, Pentagon employees who had faced the same grim task of retrieving bodies spoke openly to consultants without supervisors present. Hall did not return a telephone call placed yesterday at his office for comment. PETERSON'S REPORT cited several deficiencies in the organizational workings of fighting the fire while commending individual efforts in the face of an overwhelming tragedy. Patrolman Tony Bettencourt, a West Warwick police officer working a security detail at the crowded club, first reported the fire via his radio at 11:07 p.m. Three minutes later, at 11:10 p.m., the first West Warwick fire trucks were dispatched, including Engine 4, stationed only three-tenths of a mile away on Cowesett Avenue. Engine 4 and Ladder 1 were the first on the scene, arriving, the report states, at 11:13 p.m. -- about 6 minutes after Bettencourt's initial call. Peterson described the response as "very fast," considering it took the firefighters only three minutes to get to the fire -- once they were dispatched. On the question of whether three minutes to dispatch the trucks was acceptable, Peterson was less certain. "That's a debatable point. Should it have been two minutes? Three minutes? I don't know." The report notes that both Engine 4 and Ladder 1 arrived with two firefighters aboard -- half the minimum complement of firefighters that a national fire-prevention group recommends for such trucks. "While staffing companies to nationally recognized standards is desirable," the report states, "it is beyond the reach of many financially strapped communities." The report does not venture into whether more lives could have been saved had more firefighters been aboard those first arriving trucks. But in May 2003, Frank Montanaro, president of the Rhode Island State Association of Firefighters told The Providence Journal it would have made a difference. "With more firefighters there early, more people would have been rescued quicker," he said. "And if you could have gotten them earlier, you could have saved more lives because many of them suffocated." THE REPORT is also critical of the lack of coordination and communication among the responding fire departments. For instance, while the West Warwick Fire Department refers to the sides of a burning building numerically (the front, side 1; the left, side 2, etc.), communities such as Cranston and Warwick use a letter designation (the front, side A; the left, side B, etc.). And while Cranston, Warwick and West Warwick provide mutual aid to each other almost daily, their fire trucks have similar radio designations. For example, all three departments have an Engine 1 and a Ladder 1. "This can be very confusing when attempting to work together in a normal situation, much less one as chaotic as this incident," the report states. The reports notes the incredible stress firefighters endured while dealing with the carnage. For instance, the initial plan called for each recovery team to remove only a single body from the nightclub and then have its four members reassigned to other duties. "Unfortunately, the large number of victims compelled the teams to remove several bodies." While defending the accuracy of his report, Peterson said, "We will never know exactly what we may have missed" without the chance to interview West Warwick's firefighters. |
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