The Examination of Dan Duquette, Part Three:

I apologize for yesterday's silence; we had a small fire in the building yesterday morning. It was nothing serious, but it kept us out on the street for an hour-and-a-half and ended any chance I had of sitting down to write. So let us resume today.

As 1996 dawned, it was obvious Duquette had a clear and coherent strategy for trades: Youth for age, or quantity for quality, with an eye towards solving long-term problems whenever possible. Those fingerprints were on virtually every transaction the Sox made in '96, and it not only heartened those of us who agreed with Duquette's blueprint, but it convinced us the franchise -- still reeling from the free-agent orgies of the early '90s -- was back in good hands. But the amazing thing is: Almost every trade the Red Sox made in 1996 failed. There were varying reasons for the failures, and Duquette can't be blamed for some of them. But the big ones -- except for the secondary benefit of the acquisition of Heathcliff Slocumb, whom the Sox were able to turn into Jason Varitek and Derek Lowe 18 months later -- were all busts, and the little ones were all inconsequential.

A look at the 1996 trades:

JANUARY 10: Infielder Wil Cordero and pitcher Brian Eversgerd from Montreal for pitchers Rheal Cormier and Shayne Bennett and first baseman Ryan McGuire. Analysis: The operation was a success, but the patient died. I can't remember ever being as excited over a Red Sox trade -- save maybe for Pedro Martinez -- as I was over this one, because this was what I hoped would be Dan Duquette's modus operandi: Identify young, All-Star caliber players who were available for whatever reason (in this case, Cordero was ready to hit arbitration) and acquire them with the spillover from a bountiful farm system. The trade wound being a failure for two reasons: 1) The Sox assumed Cordero could make a seamless transition from shortstop to second base when, in fact, he could not, and 2) His domestic-violence arrest turned him into a political liability. But because of No. 1, Cordero's star had waned by the time No. 2 occured. He was a good hitter for a middle infielder, not so good for someone in a power position like left field (which is where the Sox moved him in 1997). Long term benefit or harm: There really wasn't any. Cordero's release meant the Sox came up empty on the deal, but they hadn't given up anything of value to acquire him. Nor did they have to give up anything of value -- or anything, period -- to replace him.

JANUARY 29: Pitchers Heathcliff Slocumb and Larry Wimberly and outfielder Rick Holifield from Philadelphia for pitcher Ken Ryan and outfielders Lee Tinsley and Glenn Murray. Analysis: This was another deal that inspired confidence in Duquette's ability to build a team. Rather than commit themselves to an expensive 35-year-old reliever whom they'd acquired in a trade (Rick Aguilera), the Sox let him go and found a younger and (far) less costly replacement with a potentially greater upside . . . and, again, at the cost of spare parts and minor-league expendables. Yet this patient died, too, at least in regards to the trade itself, and if you lived through Slocumb's Reign Of Terror I trust I don't have to tell you why. (That's a little harsh; Slocumb pitched pretty well at times in '96. But there's no denying he wasn't the long-term answer as the closer.) Still, the Sox weren't the first team -- nor would they be the last -- to be seduced by Heatchliff's live arm and ungodly pitch movement and textbook demeanor for the job. Long term benefit or harm: Despite Slocumb's failures, the benefits of this deal were enormous and reverberate to this day. See July 31, 1997, for details.

APRIL 18: Player to be named later (outfielder Rudy Pemberton) from Texas for pitcher Brian Eversgerd. Analysis: What appeared to be a routine swap of minor-leaguers seemed ready to explode into the Steal of the Century when Pemberton hit .512/.556/.780 in 41 September at-bats. The outburst earned him the right-handed portion of a right-field platoon in early 1997, but 27 games of .238/.314 /.365 production punched his ticket back to Pawtucket and out of the major leagues forever. Long term benefit or harm: None, unless you think there's harm in having hopes raised and dashed.

JUNE 9: Outfielder Lee Tinsley from Philadelphia for pitcher Scott Bakkum. Analysis: After two months of Alex Cole, Dwayne Hosey and Milt Cuyler in center field, Duquette cried "Uncle!" and found someone who could catch the ball, at least part of the time. But he wasn't the long-term answer -- nor was it ever thought that he was -- and the Sox found someone to take his place on July 30. Long term benefit or harm: He was like an aspirin. He provided temporary relief from the Cole/Hosey/Cuyler headache, but stronger measures were needed to really stop the pain.

JULY 23: Infielder Arquimedez Pozo from Seattle for infielder Jeff Manto. Analysis: There were those -- and I admit, I was one of them -- who thought the Sox had pulled another Bagwell-for-Andersen, but this time on the profit side of the ledger. Pozo was a stathead's delight, a power-hitting infielder with great secondary offensive skills. But his fielding was terrible, and he hit .189, with a .526 OPS, in 74 major-league at-bats spread over three years. Oops. Long term benefit or harm: Had Pozo actually been able to play, think of the problems he could have solved. The Sox could have kept Valentin at second base and let Pozo handle third after Tim Naehring went down. Or they could have put him at second and not subjected us to the Mark Lemke/Mike Benjamin tortures in the wake of Jeff Frye's injury. But the pros were right and we were wrong. I mean, who ever would have thought that Manto would outlast him in the major leagues?

JULY 30: Second baseman Roberto Mejias and pitcher Brad Tweedlie from Cincinnati for outfielder Kevin Mitchell. Analysis: Yet again, a lot of us were salivating again when they traded Jabba The Hut -- sorry, I mean Mitchell -- for another good-hitting middle infielder. Yet again, we were wrong. Long term benefit or harm: Brad Tweedlie banged around the organization for a number of years. Other than that . . .

JULY 30: Outfielder Darren Bragg from Seattle for pitcher Jamie Moyer. Analysis: Strangely -- very strangely -- this has wound up being Duquette's worst deal; the only other contender would be the Aaron Sele-to-Texas swap. (Sprague-for-Saba/Tankersley and Bichette-for-Reitsma aren't in the books yet.) And yet who could argue when it was made? Bragg was 26 and solved -- or seemed to solve -- the Sox' dual need for a center fielder/leadoff hitter. Moyer, a soft-tossing lefty, was 33 and had a lifetime record of 59-76 on the day the trade was made. But one by one, the wheels fell off Bragg's wagon. His abilities were stretched as both a center fielder and an everyday player, which led to a) the 1997 trade for Damon Buford and signing of Darren Lewis, and b) the decision to platoon Bragg in right field. But even as a platoon corner outfielder, he wasn't able to hit enough -- he couldn't get his OPS out of the mid-.700s as a platoon player, or the low .700s as a regular -- to have any value. The Sox eventually non-tendered him in 1998, leaving them with nothing to show for the deal. Moyer, meanwhile, has gone 71-35 with the Mariners since the trade. Who'da thunk? Long term benefit or harm: What would the Red Sox have given for a left-hander who could average 15 wins a season in their rotation over these last four years? What could they have accomplished had they not felt the need to import (and play) Buford and Lewis? The deal was a disaster. And, yet, given the same set of circumstances, I'd do it again. It was a trade that was philosophically sound. It should have worked. But, boy, it didn't.

JULY 31: Pitchers Mark Brandenburg and Kerry Lacy from Texas for pitcher Mike Stanton and a player to be named later (outfielder Dwayne Hosey). Analysis: Another philosophically sound trade that didn't work. Lots of people thought very highly of Lacy, and Bradenburg seemed capable of serving as the eighth or ninth pitcher on the staff. But neither panned out, and Stanton eventually wound up as a key cog in the Yankee bullpen during their World Series run. Long term benefit or harm: In hockey, they call them "four-point games". They're matchups with teams you're battling in the standings, and if you win them you not only get two points yourself but you deny two points to the team you're fighting. Well, this was a four-point trade. Stanton not only could have done his good work for the Sox, but he wouldn't have been doing his good work for the Yankees. Not that the Sox could have known Stanton would find his way from Texas to New York on the day they made the deal, but once he's out of your employ there's no telling where a player will wind up. Stanton wound up in the absolute worst place in the world, from Boston's point of view. And the Sox got very little -- nothing, really -- in return.

AUGUST 26: Pitcher Pat Mahomes from Minnesota for a player to be named later (pitcher Brian Looney). Analysis: Another philosophically sound trade that didn't work, except there was no downside to this one. Mahomes had been the Twins' prize pitching prospect in the early '90s, and Duquette felt he was worth a looksee. With the Sox, he had an ERA of 5.84 in 1996 and 8.10 in 1997. Oh, well. At least Looney didn't blossom somewhere else. Long term benefit or harm: None.

NOVEMBER 25: Outfielder Jesus Tavarez from Florida for a player to be named later (pitcher Bob Rodgers). Analysis: As I wrote recently, someone invoked Bagwell-for-Andersen when this trade was made. Snicker, snicker. Long term benefit or harm: None.

NOVEMBER 25: Player to be named later (pitcher Brent Iddon) from Seattle for outfielder Lee Tinsley. Analysis: The end, at last, of the Lee Tinsley Era. For his part in the Heathcliff Slocumb transaction, which eventually led to Varitek and Lowe joining the Sox, we'll long be grateful. Long term benefit or harm: Of this deal? None.

Back tomorrow . . .