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	April 4, 2001

Nothing like a little Jimy talk to get the e-mails humming:

Jason Danahy

I understand your use of the numbers to demonstrate Jimy's results, but I don't agree with them. A good deal of the numbers are a result of Jimy's managing.

ART: A version of this protest popped up on the bulletin board, as well, and it's legitimate. (If you have no idea what we're talking about, see last October 4's column.) My explanation/defense: The method only takes into account raw numbers, not game situations. For instance, the method has no idea Darren Lewis batted twice in the late innings with runners in scoring position Monday; it only knows he batted twice. I suppose individual game situations are something that could skew the numbers, but over a 162-game season they wouldn't -- they couldn't -- skew them very much. The method is absolutely a big-picture tool.

Where the manager could really skew the numbers is in giving a large number of at-bats to substandard hitters. Lewis batted 270 times last season, but he was the fourth outfielder. Fourth outfielders batting 270 times is absolutely unremarkable. As I said last October, look at the players available. If you want to make the case that Williams is messing up, you have to redistribute the at-bats in a way that the team would score more runs. If you don't like the players available, then blame the general manager, nor the manager. Up until a week ago, I would argue -- and have argued -- that Williams did pretty much what could be expected with the talent that's on hand.

Today, however, I can't say that with such certainty. And Michael Byrnes thinks Monday's game demonstrated why . . .

Michael Byrnes

I do think you underemphasize what happened in (Monday's) game. Jimy has made some bad in-game decisions during his time here, but never anything like what he did (Monday). Usually, Jimy will empty his bench in the seventh inning and send up pinch-hitters without seeming to consider the platoon angles -- and often getting himself "outmanaged" by his opponent. What happened (Monday) was different. Jimy didn't go to his bench at all. And, if we are to believe him, he didn't go to Hatteburg in the ninth because he thought Baltimore would go to a lefty. Usually, he doesn't hesitate to make those kind of moves!

ART: I didn't understand that, either. It didn't take hours of deep thinking to reach the conclusion that if the Orioles brought in Groom, the Sox could counter with Bichette. And that if the game went into extra innings and Baltimore brought in a right-hander to face Bichette, a lefty (Offerman) was available. So either we take Williams at his word -- that he has faith in Darren Lewis, which might be true -- or we take it to the next level . . .

Michael Byrnes

What might be going on? A week or so ago, Dan Duquette mentioned that Lou Merloni and Mike Lansing were the best candidates to play shortstop, and that Craig Grebeck was more of a utility player. Who opens the season at shortstop? Grebeck. Then Jimy Williams benches Jose Offerman (more of a Duquette-type player than a Jimy-type player) and Dante Bichette (a Duquette acquisition).

ART: On the board last week, someone -- I guess it was Gregory Lynn (Rasputin) -- made the point that unless Williams explains himself publicly, he can only be judged by his actions. I made a rather flip response about Williams not knowing or caring that he's being judged, and what I meant was the Everett situation had to be dealt with on a level out of the court of public opinion; he couldn't, and shouldn't, wait for poll results to act. (I know, I know, no one was taking a poll. You know what I mean.) But Greg had a point, and that point is more relevant today. Unless Williams says more than "manager's decision", he leaves himself open to just the sort of interpretation that Michael laid out above. And below . . .

Michael Byrnes

I think Lewis hit (Monday) for the same reason that Izzy Alcantara was benched for two weeks after Duquette refused to release him. The power struggle between manager and GM is now more important than winning games.

ART: As I said, we can't dismiss the possibility that Williams' stated reasoning -- he has faith in Darren Lewis -- was, in fact, the reason. But you can't deny that what Michael says isn't plausible. Or that others aren't reaching the same conclusion . . .

George Finch

(Williams) could regenerate himself if he sees some rays of hope, but it may be too late -- his heart may already be too heavy and the fire dying. He has had quite a few battles, especially at the end of last year. And these situations do not go away with meetings; they do their damage --sometimes very slowly, and soon the players/employees just do not see you in the same light anymore. It is not a conscious decision; it just happens. Sometimes people in his situation feel obliged to go on, but it's a wasted effort. Over the years, I have seen a lot of organizational fights and battles and have been in some myself. They do have their logic, and boy, the events starting last year with the Sox surely resemble these battles and events. As one well-known political leader and organizer explained to me years ago: "Organizations usually are destroyed from within; human nature has too much destructive elements and people are self-destructive".

ART: George has a lot of good points. Williams may have reached the point of no return. Events of the last 10 days may mean the players, at least some of them, have reached the point of no return with him. And even if they haven't, the dynamics of the situation may have changed irrevocably. If that's the case -- if every action is viewed skeptically, if every game becomes a referendum on Jimy Williams' managing skills -- then Dan Duquette should do everybody a favor and fire him tomorrow. Fire him today. There's no way that this boulder could stop if it's actually started rolling down the hill.

Williams has done a lot of unorthodox things as manager since 1997, but there was never a question of his motives; everyone felt he did things simply because he thought they'd work. But now, if every move is seen as a potential shot in a war with the organization . . . well, you can't have this. You just can't. And, in the same way that's it's impossible to regain your virginity, it may be impossible to people to put this aside and resume thinking of Jimy as a unique strategist. Or a doofus.

One last, non-Jimy item:

Mike Colucci

I'm just wondering if you have any stats on the Red Sox without Nomar over the past 3 seasons? What's their record been?

ART: I've got more than that: I've got their with-and-without record for the last four years, since Garciaparra became a regular:

        WITH GARCIAPARRA    WITHOUT GARCIAPARRA
          W   L   P.C.        W   L   P.C.
1997     73  80  .477         5   4  .556
1998     83  60  .580         9  10  .474
1999     80  55  .593        14  13  .519
2000     72  68  .514        13   9  .591
TOTALS  308 263  .539        41  36  .532

The Sox' record is only seven percentage better with Nomar than without him. Over a 162-game season, that accounts for exactly one win. (A .539 winning percentage in a 162-game season translates to an 87-75 record; a .532 winning percentage translates to 86-76.)

I made a rather definitive, off-the-cuff statement -- "If (Garciaparra) can't play (or if he can't play for a serious length of time), the Sox can't win. Period." -- on March 23 that, ah, is not exactly backed by the facts. The only caveat: The longest stretch Garciaparra ever missed in these four years is 20 days, after he injured his shoulder diving for a ball in Kansas City in May of 1998. Teams in any sport are able to withstand the loss of a great player over the short haul. Three months, which appears to be the consensus length of his absence, is a long haul. We'll see if I was right, or if I should learn to research something before I shoot off my mouth.

I will say, though, that I think we'd all be thrilled if the Sox were 41-36 on the day Garciaparra returns to the lineup.

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